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In practical decoy-state quantum key distribution, the raw key length is finite. Thus, deviation
of the estimated single photon yield and single photon error rate from their respective true values
due to finite sample size can seriously lower the provably secure key rate R. Current method to
obtain a lower bound of R follows an indirect path by first bounding the yields and error rates both
conditioned on the type of decoy used. These bounds are then used to deduce the single photon yield
and error rate, which in turn are used to calculate a lower bound of the key rate R. Here we report
an improved version of McDiarmid inequality in statistics and show how use it to directly compute a
lower bound of R via the so-called centering sequence. A novelty in this work is the optimization of
the bound through the freedom of choosing possible centering sequences. The provably secure key
rate of realistic 100 km long quantum channel obtained by our method is at least twice that of the
state-of-the-art procedure when the raw key length ℓraw is ≈ 10
5 to 106. Besides, in the ℓraw ≲ 10
11,
our method gives at least 10% improvement over the current technique. More importantly, these are
achieved by pure theoretical analysis without altering the experimental setup or the post-processing
method. In a boarder context, this work introduces powerful concentration inequality techniques in
statistics to tackle physics problem beyond straightforward statistical data analysis.
∗
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two trusted parties Alice and Bob to share a provably secure secret key by
preparing and measuring quantum states that are transmitted through a noisy channel controlled by an eavesdropper
Eve. One of the major challenges to make QKD practical is to increase the number of secure bits generated per
second [1]. That is why most QKD experiments to date use photons as the quantum information carriers; and these
photons come from phase randomize Poissonian distributed sources instead of the much less efficient single photon
sources. In addition, decoy state method is used to combat Eve’s photon-number-splitting attack on multiple photon
events emitted from the Poissonian sources [2, 3]. From the theoretical point of view, a more convenient figure of
merit is the key rate, namely, the number of provably secure secret bits per average number of photon pulses prepared
by Alice. This is because key rate measures the intrinsic performance of a QKD protocol (in other words, the software
issue) without taking the frequency of the pulse (which is a hardware issue) into account.
Provably secure lower bounds of key rates (we refer them as simply as key rates from now on) for various QKD
schemes for the realistic situation of finite raw key length have been reported. For instance, Lim et al. [4] computed
the key rates of a certain implementation of the BB84 QKD scheme [5] using three types of decoy; recently, Chau [6]
extended it to the case of using more than three types of decoys. Hayashi and Nakayama investigated the key rate for
the BB84 scheme [7]. Bra´dler et al. showed the key rate for a qudit-based QKD scheme using up to three mutually
unbiased preparation and measurement bases [8]. And Wang et al. proved that errors and fluctuations in the decoy
photon intensities only have minor errors on the final key rate [9]. Note that the provably secure key rate of a QKD
scheme is found using the following three-step strategy. First, the yields QB,µn and error rates EB,µn conditioned
on the preparation and measurement basis B as well as the photon intensity parameter µn used are determined by
comparing the relevant Bob’s measurement outcomes, if any, with Alice’s preparation states. The second step is to
deduce yields and error rates conditioned on the number of photons emitted by the source. Recall that for a phase
randomized Poissonian photon source,
QB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,m exp(−µn)
m!
(1)
and
QB,µnEB,µn =
+∞∑
m=0
µmn YB,meB,m exp(−µn)
m!
. (2)
Here, µ1 > µ2 > ⋯ > µk ≥ 0 are the photon intensities used in the decoy method with k ≥ 2. Using the result in Ref. [9],
we simply our discussion by assuming that these photon intensities are accurately determined and fixed throughout
the experiment. Moreover, YB,m is the probability of photon detection by Bob given that the photon pulse sent by
Alice contains m photons and eB,m is the bit error rate for m photon emission events prepared in the B basis [2, 3, 10].
The key rate R depends on YB,0, YB,1 and eB,1 [2–4, 10]. Nevertheless, the later quantities cannot be determined
precisely because Eqs. (1) and (2) are under-determined systems of equations given QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s provided that
the number of photon intensities used k is finite. To make things worse, in the finite-raw-key-length (FRKL) situation,
the measured values of QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s deviate from their true values due to finite sampling. Fortunately, effective
lower bounds of YB,0 and YB,1 as well as upper bound of eB,1 are available [2–4, 6, 10, 11]. In the FRKL situation,
these bounds can be deduced with the help of Hoeffding’s inequality [12]. (See, for example, Refs. [4, 6] for details.)
The third step is to deduce R from these bounds [2–4, 8, 10].
Computing lower bound of R using this indirect strategy is not satisfactory in the FRKL situation because it is
unlikely for each of the finite-size fluctuations in QB,µn ’s and EB,µn ’s to decrease the value of the provably secure key
rate. In fact, for a given security parameter, the worst case bounds on YB,0 and YB,1 cannot be not attained simulta-
neously if the raw key length is finite. (This is evident, say, from the bounds of YB,0 and YB,1 given by Inequalities (2)
and (3) in Ref. [4] or Inequalities (12a) and (12b) in Ref. [6]. Note that there is a typo in Inequality (12b) — the
Q
⟪k0−i⟫
B,µi
there should be Q
⟪k0−i+1⟫
B,µi
. In all cases, the finite-size statistical fluctuation that leads to the saturation of
lower bound for YB,0 does not cause the saturation of the lower bound for YB,1 and vice versa.)
It is more effective if one could directly investigate the influence of finite-key-length on the key rate. To do so, one
has to go beyond the use of Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the statistical fluctuation, which only works for equally
weighted sum of random variables that are either statistical independent or drawn from a finite population without
replacement [12]. Here we use the computation of the key rate of a specific BB84 QKD protocol [5] that generates
the raw key solely from X basis measurement results as an example to illustrate how to directly tackle statistical
fluctuation in the FRKL situation by means of McDiarmid-type inequality [13] in statistics. The technique used
here can be easily adapted to compute the key rates of other QKD schemes using finite-dimensional qudits in the
3FRKL situation. Our work here is based on an earlier preprint by one of the us [14]. Here we greatly extend and
improve the original proposal by first proving a new and slightly extended McDiarmid-type of inequality on so-called
centering sequences. (See Def. 1 for the precise definition of a centering sequence.) Then we apply it through four
different methods, each giving a separate provably secure key rate. We also optimize the provably secure key rate R by
expoiting our freedom to pick the centering sequences. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an optimization is
performed. In contrast, this type of optimization is not possible in previous approach that makes use of a less general
inequality known as Hoeffding’s inequality. It turns out that each method works best in different situations; and the
best provably secure key rate among the four methods in realistic practical situation is at least about 10% better than
the state-of-the-art method before Ref. [14]. Moreover, for raw key length ℓraw ≈ 105 to 107, this work almost double
the secure key rate of the original proposal in Ref. [14] when four different photon intensities are used.
II. FINITE-SIZE DECOY STATE KEY RATE
Recall that the error rate for this particular BB84 QKD scheme is lower-bounded by [4, 6]
p2
X
{⟨exp(−µ)⟩YX,0 + ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩YX,1[1 −H2(ep)] −ΛEC − ⟨QX,µ⟩
ℓraw
[6 log2 χ
ǫsec
+ log2 2
ǫcor
]} , (3)
where pX denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) uses X as the preparation (measurement) basis, ⟨f(µ)⟩ ≡∑kn=1 pµnf(µn) with pµn being the probability for Alice to use photon intensity parameter µn. Furthermore,
H2(x) ≡ −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function, ep is the phase error rate of the single
photon events in the raw key, and ΛEC is the actual number of bits of information that leaks to Eve as Alice and Bob
perform error correction on their raw bits. It is given by
ΛEC = ⟨QX,µH2(EX,µ)⟩ (4)
if they use the most efficient (classical) error correcting code to do the job. In addition, ℓraw is the raw sifted key
length measured in bits, ǫcor is the upper bound of the chance that the final secret keys shared between Alice and
Bob are different, Eve’s information on the final key is at most ǫsec [15–17]. Last but not least, χ is a QKD scheme
specific factor which depends on the detailed security analysis used. In general, χ may also depend on other factors
used in the QKD scheme such as the number of photon intensities k [4, 6].
For BB84, ep → eZ,1 as ℓraw → +∞. More importantly, the best known bound on the difference between ep and eZ,1
due to finite sample size correction using properties of the hypergeometric distribution reported in given by [6, 18]
ep ≤ eZ,1 + γ¯ (ǫsec
χ
, eZ,1,
sZYZ,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩⟨QZ,µ⟩ ,
sXYX,1⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩⟨QX,µ⟩ ) (5)
with probability at least 1 − ǫsec/χ, where
γ¯(a, b, c, d) ≡
¿ÁÁÀ(c + d)(1 − b)b
cd
ln [ c + d
2πcd(1 − b)ba2 ], (6)
and sB is the number of bits that are prepared and measured in B basis. Clearly, sX = ℓraw and sZ ≈ (1 −
pX)2sX⟨QZ,µ⟩/(p2X⟨QX,µ⟩). (Note that γ¯ becomes complex if a, c, d are too large. This is because in this case no
ep ≥ eZ,1 exists with failure probability a. We carefully picked parameters here so that γ¯ is real.)
In the infinite-key-length limit, statistical fluctuations of QB,µn and EB,µn can be ignored. Then based on the
analysis in Ref. [6] with typos corrected, one has
YB,0 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a0nQB,µn) ≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=k0
−QB,µn exp[µn]∏ˆi≠nµi
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ , (7a)
YB,1 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQB,µn) ≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=3−k0
−QB,µn exp[µn]Sˆn
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ (7b)
and
YZ,1eZ,1 ≤min(YZ,1
2
,
k∑
n=1
a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn) ≡min⎛⎝YZ,12 ,
k∑
n=k0
QZ,µnEZ,µn exp[µn]Sˆn
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ , (7c)
4where k0 = 1(2) if k is even (odd), and ∏ˆj≠n is over the dummy variable j from k0 to k but skipping n. In addition,
Sˆn = ∑′′ µt1µt2⋯µtk−k0−1 where the double primed sum is over k0 ≤ t1 < t2 < ⋯ < tk−k0−1 ≤ k with t1, t2, . . . , tk−k0−1 ≠ n.
(In other words, a01 = a21 = 0 if k is odd and a11 = 0 if k is even.) Note that in our subsequent analysis, we also need
the following two inequalities, which can be proven using the same method as in Inequality (7b):
YZ,1e¯Z,1 ≡ YZ,1(1 − eZ,1) ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn) ≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=3−k0
−QZ,µnE¯Z,µn exp[µn]Sˆn
∏ˆj≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ (7d)
and
YZ,1eZ,1 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnEZ,µn) ≡max⎛⎝0,
k∑
n=3−k0
−QZ,µnEZ,µn exp[µn]Sˆn∏j≠n[µn − µj]
⎞⎠ , (7e)
where E¯Z,µn = 1 −EZ,µn .
Substituting Inequalities (5) and (7) into Expression (3) gives the following lower bound of the key rate
k∑
n=1
bnQX,µn − p2X {ΛEC + ⟨QX,µ⟩ℓraw [6 log2
χ
ǫsec
+ log2 2
ǫcor
]} , (8)
where
bn = p2X {⟨exp(−µ)⟩a0n + ⟨µ exp(−µ)⟩a1n[1 −H2(ep)]} (9)
provided that YX,0, YX,1 > 0. (The cases of YX,0 or YX,1 = 0 can be dealt with in the same way by changing the definition
of bn accordingly. But these cases are not interesting for they likely imply R = 0 in realistic channels.)
Note that the worst case key rate corresponds to the situation that the spin flip and phase shift errors in the
raw key are uncorrelated so that Alice and Bob cannot use the correlation information to increase the efficiency of
entanglement distillation. Thus, we may separately consider statistical fluctuations in QX,µn ’s and eZ,1 in the FRKL
situation.
III. AN IMPROVED VERSION OF MCDIARMID INEQUALITY
Statistical fluctuations in QX,µn ’s and eZ,1 can be bounded using McDiarmid-type inequality. Actually, the first
inequality of this type was proven for the case of statistically independent random variables using martingale technique
in Ref. [13]. The inequality we need here is a straightforward extension of Theorem 6.7 in Ref. [13] and Theorem 2.3
in Ref. [19] for statistically dependent random variables. (See also a closely related version in Ref. [20].)
We first introduce the concept of a centering sequence [19]. The definition below is written in a more apparent
manner to physicists.
Definition 1. Let W = (W1,W2, . . . ,Wt) be a random real vector whose components Wi’s are possibly statistically
dependent random variables each taking values in the set Wi. Let fm be a real-valued bounded function of W. Set
Vm = fm(W)∣Bm where Bm denotes the conditions Wj = wj for j = 1,2, . . . ,m − 1. Then, the sequence of random
variable {Vm}tm=1 is said to be centering if E[Um ∣ Vm−1 = v] ≡ E[Vm − Vm−1 ∣ Vm−1 = v] is a decreasing functions of
v for all m = 1,2, . . . , t. (Here we use the convention that V0 = 0 and assume that all conditional expectation values
E[⋅ ∣ ⋅] exist.)
Note that centering property implicitly depends on the distribution ofW through the conditional expectation value
of Um. Moreover, {Vm} is centering if {Vm} is a martingale.
Theorem 1. Using notations in Definition 1, for a fixed i = 1,2, . . . , t, let wm ∈Wm and set
rˆm(w1, . . . ,wm−1) = ess sup{E[Um(W) ∣Wm = wm]}wm∈Wm − ess inf{E[Um(W) ∣Wm = w′m]}w′m∈Wm≡ bm(w1, . . . ,wm−1) − am(w1, . . . ,wm−1). (10)
Here the symbols ess sup and ess inf denote the essential supremum and infimum, respectively. Further set rˆ2 ≡
rˆ2(w1, . . . ,wt−1) = ∑tm=1 rˆ2m. Then ft(w) ≡ ft(w1,w2, . . . ,wt) obeys
Pr(ft(w) −E[ft(W)] ≥ δ) ≤ exp [ −2δ2
rˆ2(w1, . . . ,wt−1)] (11a)
5and
Pr(ft(w) −E[ft(W)] ≤ −δ) ≤ exp [ −2δ2
rˆ2(w1, . . . ,wt−1)] (11b)
for any δ > 0, where Pr(⋅) denotes the occurrence probability of the argument.
Remark 1. This version of McDiarmid inequality is slightly stronger than the one reported in Ref. [13] as we also
utilize information of w in obtaining rˆ whereas the original version in Ref. [13] made use of the worst case w. The
proof of this theorem is based on that of Theorem 2.2 in Ref. [19].
Proof. Note that for any h, δ > 0,
Pr(Vt −E[Vt] ≥ δ)
≤ E[exp{h(Vt −E[Vt] − δ)}] = e−h(δ+E[Vt])E[exp(hVt)] (by Bernstein’s inequality)
= e−h(δ+E[Vt])E[exp(hVt−1)E[exp(hUt) ∣ Vt−1]]
≤ e−h(δ+E[Vt])E [exp(hVt−1){(bt −E[Ut ∣ Vt−1])ehat
bt − at
+
(E[Ut ∣ Vt−1] − at)ehbt
bt − at
}] (since at ≤ E[Ut ∣ Vt−1] ≤ bt and the line joining(at, ehat) and (bt, ehbt) is above the curve y = ehx
for x ∈ [at, bt])
≤ e−h(δ+E[Vt])E[exp(hVt−1)]{(bt −E[Ut ∣ Vt−1])ehat
bt − at
+
(E[Ut ∣ Vt−1] − at)ehbt
bt − at
} (by Chebyshev’s sum inequality on centering sequence)
≤ e−h(δ+E[Vt−1])e−hE[Ut ∣Vt−1] {(bt −E[Ut ∣ Vt−1])ehat
bt − at
+
(E[Ut ∣ Vt−1] − at)ehbt
bt − at
} . (12)
To proceed, we consider the function g(h) = −hx + ln{[(bt − x)ehat + (x − at)ehbt]/(bt − at)} for x ∈ [at, bt]. It is
straightforward to check that g(0) = dg/dh∣h=0 = 0. Moreover,
d2g
dh2
= (bt − at)2(b − x)(x − a)eh(bt+at)[(b − x)ehat + (x − a)ehbt]2 ≤
(bt − at)2
4
(13)
with the equality holds whenever (b−x)ehat = (x− a)ehbt . Therefore, Taylor’s theorem gives g(h) ≤ h2(bt − at)2/8 for
all h ≥ 0. Applying this inequality with x = E[Ut ∣ Vt−1] to Inequality (12), we have
Pr(ft(w) −E[ft(W)] ≥ δ) = Pr(Vt −E[Vt] ≥ δ) ≤ e−h(δ+E[Vt−1])eh2(bt−at)2/8
≤ exp [−δh + h2∑tm=1(bm − am)2
8
] = exp(h2rˆ2
8
− δh) (14)
for any h > 0. The R.H.S. of Inequality (14) is minimized by setting h = 4δ/rˆ2; and with this h, Inequality (14)
becomes Inequality (11a).
Finally, by applying the same argument to −fm’s instead of fm’s, we get Inequality (11b). This completes our
proof.
Corollary 1. Let W = (W1, . . . ,Wt) be a random vector such that Wm takes on value from the same bounded set
of real numbers W = {αj}kj=1 for all m = 1,2, . . . , t. Suppose further that Wm’s are multivariate hypergeometrically
distributed. Let fm(W) = ∑mi=1Wi for all m = 1,2, . . . , t. Then, the sequence of random variables {Vm}tm=1 defined in
Definition 1 is centering provided that E[Vm − Vm−1 ∣ Vm−1 = v] is well-defined for all v. Besides, Theorem 1 holds
with rˆ =√tWidth(W), where Width(W) ≡ ess supW − ess infW.
6Proof. This proof is adapted from Example 1 in Ref. [19]. From Definition 1, it suffices to show that E[Um ∣ ∑m−1i=1 Wi =
υ] = E[Wm ∣ ∑m−1i=1 Wi = υ] is a decreasing function of υ. Suppose Wi’s are drawn from a collection of M objects out
of which Mj of them take the value αj for all j. Suppose further that among Wi’s with 1 ≤ i < m, there are mj of
them taking the value of αj for all j. Then, the probability that Wm = αj is (Mj −mj)/(M −m + 1). Moreover, the
condition ∑m−1i=1 Wi = υ means that ∑mjαj = υ. As a result, E[Wm ∣ ∑m−1i=1 Wi = υ] = ∑j(Mj −mj)αj/(M −m + 1) =(∑jMjαj − υ)/(M −m + 1), which is a decreasing function of υ whenever ∑m−1i=1 Wi = υ. Hence, {Vm} is a centering
sequence.
By applying Theorem 1 to {Um}, we have rm = ess sup{Wm ∣ Vm−1 = υ} − ess inf{Wm ∣ Vm−1 = υ} = ess supW −
ess infW =Width(W) for all m and Vm−1. Hence, it is proved.
Remark 2. The above corollary was first proven by Hoeffding in Ref. [12] without using the concept of centering
sequence. Actually, Corollary 1 is more often referred to as the Hoeffding’s inequality. In fact, Hoeffding’s inequality
has been used to compute the provably secure key rate R when the raw key length ℓraw is finite in previous works [4, 6–8].
In Sec. IV below, we use the above corollary to bound eZ,1 in Methods A and B.
Corollary 2. Let W = (W1, . . . ,Wt) be a random vector where each Wm takes on value from a bounded set of real
numbers W = {αj}kj=1. Suppose Wm’s are multivariate hypergeometrically distributed in the sense that they are chosen
without replacement from a collection of M objects out of which Mj of them take the value of αj for all j. Let
x ∈ [ess infW , ess supW] and y > 0 be two fixed numbers. Let P ∶{1,2, . . . , t} ↦ {1,2, . . . , t} be an arbitrary but fixed
permutation. Suppose
y +
t∑
i=1
WP (i) > ess supW − ess infW ≥ 0. (15)
Define
fm(W) = (t −m)x +∑mi=1WP (i)
y + (t −m)x +∑mi=1WP (i) (16)
for m = 1,2, . . . , t. Then, the sequence {Vm}tm=1 is centering provided that
x ≤ tmin
m=1
2∑kj=1Mjαj − sup∑m−1i=1 WP (i) + y − δ
2M − t −m + 1
(17)
where δ is a small correlation term of the order of Width(W)/(y + tx)2. Furthermore, by picking x to be the R.H.S.
of Inequality (17), then Inequality (11) is true with
rˆ2 = t∑
m=1
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
yWidth(W)[y + (t −m)x + ess supW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i)][y + (t −m)x + ess infW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i)]
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
2
, (18)
where {wP (i)} is a decreasing sequence.
Proof. Since (WP (1),WP (2), . . . ,WP (t)) is also a multivariate hypergeometrically distributed random vector, we only
need to prove the case when P is an identity operator as the general case can be proven in the same way. From
Eq. (15), fm has a positive denominator and is an increasing function of Wm. So to prove that {Vm} is centering, it
suffices to show that E[Um ∣ ∑m−1i=1 Wi = (m−1)w] is a decreasing function of (m−1)w = ∑kj=1mjαj for all non-negative
integers mj ’s obeying ∑kj=1mj = m − 1. Since αj ’s are fixed, the only way to change w is to change mj’s but at the
same time keeping ∑nj=1mj fixed. Clearly, w can only be changed if m ≥ 3. More importantly, as mj ’s are integers,
any such change can be expressed as a composition of a series of elementary changes, each increases a certain mj1 by
one and decreasing a certain mj2 by one with 1 ≤ j1 ≠ j2 ≤ k.
7Observe that
E
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣Um ∣
m−1∑
i=1
Wi = (m − 1)w = k∑
j=1
mjαj
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
= E ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
y(Wm − x){y + (t −m + 1)x + (m − 1)w}{y + (t −m)x + (m − 1)w +Wm} ∣
m−1∑
i=1
Wi = (m − 1)w = k∑
j=1
mjαj
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
= y(M −m + 1)[y + (t −m + 1)x + (m − 1)w]
k∑
j=1
(Mj −mj)(αj − x)
y + (t −m)x + (m − 1)w + αj
≡ y(M −m + 1)D
k∑
j=1
(Mj −mj)(αj − x)
D + αj − x
. (19)
Moreover, after the elementary change, w ↦ w+αj1 −αj2 ≡ w+∆w. From Inequality (15), D > ∣αj −x∣. So by Taylor’s
theorem,
E
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣Um ∣
m−1∑
i=1
Wi = (m − 1)w = k∑
j=1
mjαj
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
z→ E
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣Um ∣
m−1∑
i=1
Wi = (m − 1)w +∆w = αj1 − αj2 + k∑
j=1
mjαj
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
= y(M −m + 1)(D +∆w)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
k∑
j=1
(Mj −mj)(αj − x)
D +∆w
[1 − αj − x
D +∆w
+ ξ1 ( αj − x
D +∆w
)2] + −(αj1 − x)
D +∆w + αj1
+
αj2 − x
D +∆w + αj2
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
= y(M −m + 1)(D +∆w)2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
k∑
j=1
Mjαj − (M −m + 1)x − (m − 1)w − ∑nj=1(Mj −mj)(αj − x)2
D +∆w
+ ξ1 ( αj − x
D +∆w
)2⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
−
y∆w(M −m + 1)(D +∆w + αj1 − x)(D +∆w + αj2 − x) (20)
with ξ1 ∈ [0,1]. As x ∈ [ess infW , ess supW], we conclude that 0 ≤ ∑j(Mj −mj)(αj − x)2 ≤ (M −m + 1)Width(W)2
almost surely. From Inequality (15), we may expand 1/(D +∆w), 1/(D +∆w + αj1 − x) and 1/(D +∆w + αj2 − x) as
series of ∆w via Taylor’s theorem. In this way, the R.H.S. of Eq. (20) can be expressed in the form E[Um ∣ ∑m−1i=1 Wi =(m − 1)w = ∑kj=1mjαj] + g1∆w + g2 with
g1 = − y(M −m + 1)D2
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
2 [∑kj=1Mjαj − (M −m + 1)x − (m − 1)w]
D
+ [1 − ξ2(αj1 − x)
D
][1 − ξ3(αj2 − x)
D
]
−
3∑kj=1(Mj −mj)(αj − x)2
D2
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
≤ − y(M −m + 1)D2
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
2 [∑kj=1Mjαj − (M −m + 1)x − (m − 1)w]
D
+ [1 − Width(W)
D
]2 − 3(M −m + 1)Width(W)2
D2
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ,
(21)
where ξ2, ξ3 ∈ [0,1]. And the correlation term g2 obeys ∣g2∣ ≤ 3y[∑jMjαj − (M −m + 1)x − (m − 1)w](∆w)2/[(M −
m + 1)D4].
A sufficient condition for {Vm} to be centering is g1∆w+g2 ≤ 0 for all m and w. Moreover, this condition is satisfied
if
x ≤ 2∑kj=1Mjαj − (m − 1)w + y − δ
2M − t −m + 1
(22)
for all m = 1, . . . , t and for all (m− 1)w = ∑m−1i=1 Wi, where the correlation term δ ≤ ∣g2∣∆w + 2Width(W)+ (3M − 3m+
2)Width(W)2/D. (Note that Inequality (22) is consistent with the constraint that ess infW ≤ x ≤ ess supW because
this inequality is trivially satisfied when x = ess infW .) Hence, {Vm} is centering if Inequality (17) holds.
We now switch back to consider the situation of an arbitrary but fixed permutation P . To optimize the bound
in Theorem 1, we use the freedom to pick a suitable permutation P to minimize rˆ. From Theorem 1, rˆm =
8yWidth(W)/{[y + (t − m)x + ess supW + ∑m−1i=1 wP (i)][y + (t − m)x + ess infW + ∑m−1i=1 wP (i)]}, which is a decreas-
ing function of both x and w. Hence, the optimal situation occurs when we pick the permutation so that wP (i) is
a decreasing function of i. In this case, ∑mi=1 wP (i)/m is a decreasing function of m. In this way, we arrive at rˆ2 in
Eq. (18).
Remark 3. The ability to optimize rˆ by means of picking the best possible permutation P and hence the best possible
centering sequence is a novel feature of McDairmid inequality. As far as we know, this feature has not been exploited
before. In contrast, from the proof of Corollary 1, it is clear that the value of rˆ obtained from the Hoeffding’s
inequality does not depend on the choice of P . In Sec. IV below, we fully expoit this freedom of picking P to bound
eZ,1 in Method D. Note however that the above Corollary requires the knowledge of Mj’s. In addition, rˆ
2 is written
as a rather involved sum. Let us replace every wP (i) in Eq. (18) by the average observed value, namely, ∑ti=1wi/t. In
this way, rˆ would increase by a factor of O(tWidth(W)/D). Suppose that we fix x = ∑ti=1wi/t ≡ ⟨w⟩ as well (without
caring whether Inequality (17) holds or not). Then rˆ would change by a factor of O(Width(W)/D√t) most of the
time due to statistical fluctuation. Thus, in practice, we may replace rˆ in Eq. (18) by the following more convenient
and useful expression
rˆ =
√
tyWidth(W)[y + (t − 1)⟨w⟩ + ess infW][y + (t − 1)⟨w⟩ + ess supW] , (23)
which does not depend on the knowledge of Mj’s. This expression for rˆ shall be used to bound eZ,1 in Method C to be
reported in Sec. IV.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE IMPROVED MCDIARMID INEQUALITY IN FINDING THE KEY RATE
There is a subtlety in applying Theorem 1 to study the statistical fluctuation of eZ,1. A naive way to do so is to
use Inequalities (5) and (7) to obtain the bound eZ,1 ≤ (∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn)/(∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µn). Then one could regard
QZ,µn ’s and QZ,µnEZ,µn ’s as random variables and directly apply Theorem 1 and Definition 1 to the R.H.S. of the
above inequality. Nonetheless, it does not work for the R.H.S. of this inequality need not be bounded. Besides, the
bound obtained is not strong enough even if we ignore the boundedness problem.
To proceed, we first write QZ,µn = ∑j W˜nj/s˜Z,µn where s˜Z,µn is the number of photon pulses that Alice prepares
using photon intensity µn and that Alice prepares and Bob tries to measure (but may or may not have detection)
in Z basis. In addition, W˜nj denotes the possibly correlated random variable whose value is 1 (0) if the jth photon
pulse among the s˜Z,µn photon pulses is (not) detected by Bob. Clearly, s˜Z,µn ≈ Tp2Zpµn with T being the total number
of photon pulses sent by Alice and pZ = 1 − pX is the probability for Alice (Bob) to prepare (measure) in the Z basis.
Since sZ ≈ Tp2Z⟨QZ,µ⟩, I arrive at
YZ,1 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µn) =max⎛⎝0, ⟨QZ,µ⟩sZ
k∑
n=1
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
a1n
pµn
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣∑j W˜nj
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
⎞⎠ =max(0, ⟨QZ,µ⟩sZ
sZ∑
i=1
WZ,i) . (24a)
Here WZ,i is the random variable that takes the value a1n/pµn if the ith photon pulse that are prepared by Alice and
then successfully measured by Bob both in the Z basis is in fact prepared using photon intensity µn. Recall that
Eve knows the number of photons in each pulse and may act accordingly. However, she does not know the photon
intensity parameter used in each pulse and the preparation basis until the pulse is measured by Bob. Hence, WZ,n’s
may be correlated. Actually, the most general situation is that WZ,n’s are drawn from a larger population without
replacement. That is to say, these random variables obey the multivariate hypergeometric distribution. By the same
argument, Inequalities (7c) and (7d) gives
YZ,1eZ,1 ≤min(YZ,1
2
,
k∑
n=1
a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn) =min⎛⎝YZ,12 , ⟨QZ,µ⟩sZ
se
Z∑
i=1
W e
Z,i
⎞⎠ (24b)
and
YZ,1e¯Z,1 ≥max(0, k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn) =max⎛⎝0, ⟨QZ,µ⟩sZ
se¯
Z∑
i=1
W e¯
Z,i
⎞⎠ , (24c)
where se
Z
= sZ⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩/⟨QZ,µ⟩ and se¯Z = sZ⟨QZ,µE¯Z,µ⟩/⟨QZ,µ⟩) are the number of bits that are prepared and successfully
measured in the Z basis such that the preparation by Alice and measurement result by Bob are unequal and equal,
9respectively. Moreover,W e
Z,i’s (W
e¯
Z,i’s) are multivariate hypergeometrically distributed random variables taking values
in the set {a2n/pµn}kn=1 ({a1n/pµn}kn=1).
From Inequalities (24a) –(24c), eZ,1 obeys
eZ,1 ≤max⎛⎝0,min⎛⎝12 , ∑
se
Z
i=1W
e
Z,i
∑sZj=1WZ,j
⎞⎠⎞⎠ (25a)
and
eZ,1 ≤max⎛⎜⎝0,min
⎛⎜⎝
1
2
,
∑seZi=1W eZ,i
∑seZi=1W eZ,i +∑se¯Zj=1W e¯Z,j
⎞⎟⎠
⎞⎟⎠ . (25b)
Interestingly, these two inequalities can be used to give four different bounds on the finite-size statistical fluctuations
in eZ,1. More importantly, these four bounds are
A. Use an upper bound of ∑seZi=1W eZ,i and a lower bound of ∑sZj=1WZ,j to deduce an upper bound of eZ,1. Specif-
ically, from Corollary 1, we conclude that the true value of ∑sZj=1WZ,j is less than the observed value by[sZ ln(1/ǫZ)/2]1/2Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1) with probability at most ǫZ. (Recall that Width(W) of a bounded setW
of real numbers is defined as ess supW − ess infW .) And the true value of ∑seZi=1W eZ,i is greater than its observed
value by [se
Z
ln(1/ǫe
Z
)/2]1/2Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1) = [sZ⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)/2⟨QZ,µ⟩]1/2Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1) with
probability at most ǫe
Z
. Since W e
Zi
and WZ,j are positively correlated, from Inequalities (24a), (24b) and (25a),
we have
eZ,1 ≤max(0,min(1
2
,
∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn +∆YZ,1eZ,1
∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µn −∆YZ,1 )) (26a)
with probability at least 1 − ǫZ − ǫ
e
Z
, where
∆YZ,1eZ,1 = [⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)
2sZ
]1/2Width⎛⎝{a2npµn }
k
n=1
⎞⎠ (26b)
and
∆YZ,1 = ⟨QZ,µ⟩ [ ln(1/ǫZ)
2sZ
]1/2Width⎛⎝{a1npµn }
k
n=1
⎞⎠ . (26c)
Incidentally, this is the method reported in the preprint by one of us in Ref. [14]. Moreover, similar bounds
on statistical fluctuations of QB,n’s and QB,1EB,1 have been obtained using Hoeffding’s inequality in Refs. [4, 6].
That method is not as effective as the one reported here since they indirectly deal with finite sampling statistical
fluctuation of YZ,1 and YZ,1eZ,1.
B. Alternatively, we may use Inequality (25b) and Corollary 1 to bound eZ,1. Specifically, the true value of∑se¯Zj=1W e¯Z,j
is less than the observed value by [sZ⟨QZ,µE¯Z,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫe¯Z)/2⟨QZ,µ⟩]1/2Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1) with probability at
most ǫe¯
Z
. Note that W e
Z,j ’s and W
e¯
Z,j ’s are statistically independent. Therefore, from Inequalities (24b), (24c)
and (25b), we have
eZ,1 ≤max(0,min(1
2
,
∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn +∆YZ,1eZ,1
∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn +∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1 +∆YZ,1eZ,1)) (26d)
with probability at least 1 − ǫe
Z
− ǫe¯
Z
, where ∆YZ,1eZ,1 is given by Eq. (26b) and
∆YZ,1e¯Z,1 = [⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µE¯Z,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)
2sZ
]1/2Width⎛⎝{a1npµn }
k
n=1
⎞⎠ . (26e)
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C. An even more interesting way to bound eZ,1 is to use Inequality (25b), Corollary 2 and Remark 3. Since ⟨w⟩ in
this case is the measured YZ,1eZ,1/seZ, which is lower-bounded by Inequality (7e), Remark 3 gives
eZ,1 ≤max(0,min(1
2
,
∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn
∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn +∑kn=1 a2nQZ,µnEZ,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1 +∆eZ,1)) (26f)
with probability at least 1 − ǫe¯
Z
− ǫe
Z
, where
∆eZ,1 = [⟨QZ,µ⟩⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ ln(1/ǫeZ)
2sZ
]1/2 ( k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1)Width⎛⎝{a2npµn }
k
n=1
⎞⎠
× [ k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1 + (1 − ⟨QZ,µ⟩
sZ⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩)
k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnEZ,µn +
⟨QZ,µ⟩2
s2
Z
⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩ kmaxn=1 {
a2n
pµn
}]−1
× [ k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1 + (1 − ⟨QZ,µ⟩
sZ⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩)
k∑
n=1
a1nQZ,µnEZ,µn +
⟨QZ,µ⟩2
s2
Z
⟨QZ,µEZ,µ⟩
k
min
n=1
{a2n
pµn
}]−1
(26g)
provided that Inequalities (15) and (17) hold. (See Ref. [21] for an alternative proof of this result.)
D. There is an alternative way to apply Inequality (25b) and Corollary 2 to find ∆eZ,1 in Inequality (26f), which is
quite aggressive. Since ∑ti=1wi/t is an estimate of YZ,1eZ,1 = ⟨w⟩, we know from Corollary 1 and Inequality (7e)
that ⟨w⟩ ≥ ∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µnEZ,µn −∆YZ,1eZ,1 with probability at least 1 − ǫeZ. In other words, by fixing t = seZ and
x = (∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µnEZ,µn −∆YZ,1eZ,1)/seZ, we conclude that Inequality (22) is satisfied with probability at least
1−ǫe
Z
. Next, we could upper-bound the R.H.S. of Eq. (18) by approximating the sum overm there by an integral.
Specifically, set y = ∑kn=1 a1nQZ,µnE¯Z,µn −∆YZ,1e¯Z,1, then
rˆ2 ≈ t∑
m=1
∫ 1
0
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
y
y + (t −m + 1)x + ess infW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
−
y
y + (t −m + 1)x + ess supW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
2
dµ
= y2 t∑
m=1
1
wP (m) − x
⎛⎝ −1y + (t −m + 1)x + ess infW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
−1
y + (t −m + 1)x + ess supW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
+
2
Width(W) ln
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
y + (t −m + 1)x + ess supW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
y + (t −m + 1)x + ess infW +∑m−1i=1 wP (i) + µ[wP (m) − x]
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
⎞⎠
RRRRRRRRRRR
1
µ=0
. (26h)
As wP (m)’s are arranged in descending order and W in our case is the set {⟨QZ,µ⟩a2n/(pµnsZ)}kn=1 of at most k
elements, R.H.S. of the above inequality can be simplified to a big sum of at most k terms. To be more explicit,
suppose the descending sequence {wP (m)}tm=1 contains n(1) copies of w(1), followed by n(2) copies of w(2), and
so on until ending with n(k) copies of w(k). Surely, ∑ki=1 n(i) = t = seZ and ∑ki=1 n(i)w(i)/t is the observed ⟨w⟩.
Then, Eq. (26h) becomes
rˆ2 ≈ y2 k∑
m=1
1
w(m) − x
( −1
y + (t −∑i<m n(i) + 1)x + ess infW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
−1
y + (t −∑i<m n(i) + 1)x + ess supW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
+
2
Width(W) ln{y + (t −∑i<m n
(i)
+ 1)x + ess supW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
y + (t −∑i<m n(i) + 1)x + ess infW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x] })∣
n(m)
µ=0
, (26i)
which is efficient to compute. (Note that the sum in R.H.S. of Eq. (18) is a decreasing function of x and wP (i)’s,
the above integral approximation is accurate up to a correction term of at most Width(W)2 = O(1/s2
Z
). Surely,
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this correction can be safely ignored in practice provided that t = se
Z
≳ 104.) In this way, Inequality (26f) holds
with probability at least 1 − ǫe¯
Z
− 2ǫe
Z
with
∆eZ,1 = rˆ [ ln(1/ǫeZ)
2
]1/2 , (26j)
where rˆ is given by the R.H.S. of Inequality (26i).
In reality, we use the minimum of the above four methods to upper-bound the value of eZ,1. To study the statistical
fluctuation of R, it remains to consider the fluctuation of QX,µn in the first term in Expression (8). (Although the
second term also depends on QX,µn ’s implicitly through ΛEC, statistical fluctuation is absent from this term. This
is because ΛEC is the amount of information leaking to Eve during classical post-processing of the measured raw
bits. Thus, it depends on the observed values of QX,µn ’s and EX,µn ’s instead of their true values.) Using the same
technique as in the estimation of statistical fluctuation in eZ,1, the first term of Expression (8) can be rewritten as⟨QX,µ⟩∑sXi=1WX,i where WX,i’s are multivariate hypergeometrically distributed random variables each taken values in
the set {bn/pµn}kn=1. Here bn is given by Eq. (9) with ep equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) where eZ,1 is given by any
one of the following four equations depending on which of the four methods we use: Eq. (26a), (26d), (26f) and (26j).
Corollary 1 implies that due to statistical fluctuation, the true value of the first term in Expression (8) is lower than
the observed value by ⟨QX,µ⟩ [ln(1/ǫX)/(2sX)]1/2Width({bn/pµn}kn=1) with probability at most ǫX. We remark that
this way of finding a lower bound for ∑n bnQX,µn is more direct than the standard one that separately bounds YX,0
and YX,1 [4, 6, 8, 11].
Putting everything together and by setting ǫX = ǫZ = ǫeZ = ǫe¯Z = ǫγ¯ = ǫsec/χ, we conclude that the secret key rate R
satisfies
R = k∑
n=1
bnQX,µn − ⟨QX,µ⟩{ ln[χ/ǫsec]2sX }
1/2
Width
⎛⎝{ bnpµn }
k
n=1
⎞⎠ − p2X {⟨QX,µH2(EX,µ)⟩ + ⟨QX,µ⟩sX [6 log2
χ
ǫsec
+ log2
2
ǫcor
]} ,
(27)
where bn = bn(ep) is given by Eq. (9). Here ep equals the R.H.S. of Inequality (5) with eZ,1 given by Eq. (26a), (26d),
(26f) or (26j). Note that χ = 9 = 4 + 1 + 4 for Methods A to C and χ = 10 for Method D. (Here the first number
4 comes from the generalized chain rule for smooth entropy in Ref. [4], the number 1 comes from the finite-size
correction of the raw key in Eq. (B1) of Ref. [4], and the last number 4 comes from ǫγ¯ , ǫX, ǫ
e
Z
as well as either ǫZ or
ǫe¯
Z
. Moreover, χ for Method D is larger than the rest by 1 because of the extra condition on the statistical fluctuation
of a lower bound of YZ,1eZ,1.) Interestingly, unlike the schemes used in Refs. [4, 6, 7], the number χ in our scheme is
independent on the number of photon intensities k used. This is because we directly tackle the finite sample statistical
fluctuations of quantities like YB,1. Note however that even though χ does not depend on k, it does not mean that
one could use arbitrarily large number of photon intensities as decoys (so as to obtain better bounds on quantities
like YB,1) without adversely affecting the key rate for a fixed finite sX. The reason is that Width({a1n/pµn}kn=1}),
Width({a2n/pµn}kn=1}) and Width({bn/pµn}kn=1}) diverge as k → +∞ due to divergence of a1n, a2n and bn [6] as well
as the decrease in min{pµn}kn=1. Recall that computing a1n, a2n and bn is numerically stable and with minimal lost
in precision if µn −µn+1 ≳ 0.1 for n = 1,2, . . . , k−1 [6]. This means the number of photon intensities k used in practice
should be ≲ 10.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We study the following quantum channel, which models a commonly used 100 km long optical fiber in QKD
experiments, to test the performance of this new key rate formula in realistic situation. The findings here are
generic as the general trend and performance improvement are also found in other situations including using the
same fiber of different lengths as well as other randomly generated quantum channels. The yield and error rate of
that quantum channel is given by QB,µ = (1 + pap)dµ and QB,µEB,µ = pdc + emis[1 − exp(−ηchµ)] + papdµ/2, where
dµ = 1−(1−2pdc) exp(−ηsysµ). Here we fix after pulse probability pap = 4×10−2, dark count probability pdc = 6×10−7,
error rate of the optical system emis = 5 × 10−3. In addition, the transmittance of the system ηsys = 0.1ηch, and the
transmittance of the fiber is given by ηch = 10−0.2L/10 with L is the length of the fiber in km. These parameters are
obtained from optical fiber experiment on a 100 km long fiber in Ref. [22]; and have been used in Refs. [4, 6] to study
the performance of decoy-state QKD in the FRKL situation. We also follow Refs. [4, 6] by using the following security
parameters: ǫcor = κ = 10−15, where ǫsec = κℓfinal with ℓfinal ≈ RsX/(p2X⟨QX,µ⟩) is the length of the final key measured in
bits. Note that κ can be interpreted as the secrecy leakage per final secret bit.
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k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
sX R
O
−5 R
A
−5 R
B
−5 R
C
−5 R
D
−5 R
O
−5 R
A
−5 R
B
−5 R
C
−5 R
D
−5 R
O
−5 R
A
−5 R
B
−5 R
C
−5 R
D
−5 R
O
−5 R
A
−5 R
B
−5 R
C
−5 R
D
−5
105 0.052 0.300 0.326 0.470 0.254 0.027 0.270 0.291 0.487 0.747 0.000 0.152 0.156 0.160 0.142 0.000 0.052 0.076 0.076 0.000
106 0.294 0.743 0.789 0.835 0.637 0.194 0.727 0.763 0.829 1.41 0.100 0.660 0.694 0.516 0.484 0.055 0.404 0.434 0.407 0.966
107 0.687 1.18 1.23 1.22 1.04 0.573 1.27 1.30 1.27 1.84 0.421 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.12 0.259 0.949 1.01 0.823 1.57
108 1.11 1.43 1.48 1.45 1.64 1.04 1.60 1.63 1.59 2.18 0.929 1.66 1.68 1.63 1.81 0.624 1.32 1.34 1.33 2.00
109 1.51 1.70 1.75 1.72 2.05 1.57 1.91 1.94 1.90 2.40 1.46 2.04 2.10 2.06 2.37 1.08 1.74 1.75 1.71 2.38
1010 1.87 1.98 2.02 1.99 2.32 1.97 2.20 2.22 2.19 2.58 1.94 2.40 2.42 2.40 2.72 1.72 2.16 2.18 2.14 2.63
1011 2.20 2.25 2.29 2.26 2.43 2.32 2.46 2.48 2.45 2.81 2.46 2.67 2.69 2.69 2.88 2.18 2.50 2.52 2.48 2.86
TABLE I. Comparison between the state-of-the-art key rate RO ≡ RO
−5 × 10
−5 in Ref. [6] with the key rates in Eq. (27) (or
more precisely RI
−5 ≡ max(0,R
I × 10−5)) for the dedicated quantum channel used in Refs. [4, 6] via Method I. These rate are
optimized using the method stated in the main text.
Table I compares the optimized key rates for the state-of-the-art method reported recently Eq. (3) of Ref. [6] with
Eq. (27) for various sX and k. (This is the best provably secure key rate obtained before the posting of the original
proposal using McDiarmid inequality by one of us in Ref. [14].) The optimized rates are found by fixing the minimum
photon intensity to 1 × 10−6, while maximizing over pX as well as all other photon intensities µn’s and all the pµn ’s.
For Method D, the optimized key rate depends on the actual Z-basis measurement results. Here we simply fix n(i)’s
to their expectation values.
The table clearly shows that using McDiarmid inequality improves the optimized key rates in almost all cases. It
also shows that for any method used, the provably secure key rate increases as the raw key length sX increases. And
they all gradually converge to the same infinite-size key rate. Besides, the asymptotic key rate generally increases
with k. These are natural as longer sX implies smaller finite-size statistical fluctuation and larger number of decoys k
used allows better estimation of the bounds of various YB,m’s and YB,1eB,1’s.
Among the four methods introduced here, Method A almost always gives the least provably secure key rate. This
implies that it is more effective to estimate a lower bound for YZ,1 via estimating an upper bound for YZ,1eZ,1 plus a
lower bound for YZ,1e¯Z,1. Method B is slightly better than Method C for large sX (say when ≳ 10
8, the improvement
is about a few percent). Method D is about 5-15% or so better than Method C when 108 ≲ sX ≲ 10
11. This is
not unexpected for the following reason. Although Method D is more aggressive than Method C in estimating the
statistical fluctuation of eZ,1 and hence the key rate, it requires an additional condition for lower-bounding ⟨w⟩. Thus
the value of χ for Method D is 1 greater than that of Method C. As a result, for small raw key length, the improvement
in estimating eZ,1 for Method D may not be able to compensate the need to control the statistical fluctuation of one
more variable. Table I also depicts that Method D is about 5 − 20% better than Method B when 108 ≲ sX ≲ 10
11.
Furthermore, for fixed sZ and κ and a fixed method to compute bound for eZ,1, the provably secure key rate reaches
a maximum at a finite k. This is not unexpected because even though the χ we deduce is independent of the number
photon intensities k used, Width(W) diverges as k → +∞. Last but not least, in the case of k = 4, Method D always
gives the best key rate. We do not have a good answer to this observation. It is instructive to study why in future.
VI. SUMMARY
To summarize, for sX ≈ 105 − 106, at least one of the four methods reported here could produce a provably secure
key rate that is at least twice that of the state-of-the-art method. And for sX ≈ 108, Method D is at least 40% better
than the state-of-the-art method. These improvements are of great value in practical QKD because the computational
and time costs for classical post-processing can be quite high when the raw key length sX is long. More importantly,
the McDiarmid inequality method reported here is effective to increase the key rate of real or close to real time on
demand generation of the secret key — an application that is possible in near future with the advancement of laser
technology.
In addition to QKD, powerful concentration inequalities in statistics such as McDiarmid inequality could also be
used beyond straightforward statistical data analysis. One possibility is to use it to construct model independent test
for physics experiments that involve a large number of parameters but with relatively few data points.
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